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MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS 
AND REGULATION BY INSURANCE: A 
FEASIBLE PROPOSAL FOR CHINA 
QIHAO HE* 
Abstract: Climate change is one of the most fundamental challenges of our 
time. The extraordinary growth of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions in China 
represents the single greatest obstacle to global climate change efforts in the 
coming decades. Meanwhile, China suffers from the adverse consequences of 
climate change. It has been recognized that two factors may increase climate 
change risks: (a) the increase in GHG emissions, which will increase the 
frequency and intensity of climate hazards; and (b) the increase of value-at-risk, 
such as the increased concentration of the world’s population and property in 
vulnerable areas. Therefore, mitigation of climate change risk involves not only 
human intervention to reduce GHG emissions but also prevention of potential 
losses caused by climate hazards. Among many solutions to risk mitigation, 
insurance has received increased attention due to its expertise in risk 
management and regulatory function in influencing policyholders’ behavior. 
This Article examines the ability of two types of insurance—liability insurance 
and catastrophe insurance—to regulate and thus help mitigate climate change 
risks, and considers the potential lessons for China. 
INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is one of the most fundamental challenges of our time.1 
The controversy about climate change cuts across scientific theory to litiga-
tion. Most scientists who contributed to the United Nations’ Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) 2014 report believe that global 
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 1 The terms “climate change” and “global warming” are used interchangeably throughout this 
Article. Climate change is considered the phenomenon by which human activity has altered the 
Earth’s atmosphere. See JOHN J. DELANEY ET AL., HANDLING THE LAND USE CASE: LAND USE 
LAW, PRACTICE & FORMS § 42(1) (3d ed. 2016). 
320 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 43:319 
climate change is occurring on a significant scale.2 Climate change “leads to 
changes in the frequency, intensity, spatial extent, duration, and timing of 
extreme weather and climate events, and can result in unprecedented extreme 
weather and climate events.”3 It is quite plausible that damages resulting 
from climate change might mount as high as $1 trillion annually by 2040.4 In 
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,5 the Supreme Court of 
the United States for the first time recognized that greenhouse gases 
(“GHGs”) could have “a significant, disruptive impact on our climate.”6 
China is the world’s leading emitter of GHGs, having surpassed the 
United States in 2006.7 As a result, “[t]he extraordinary growth of green-
house gas emissions in China represents the single greatest challenge to 
global climate change efforts in coming decades.”8 As Alex Wang has noted: 
“Without significant contribution from China, efforts to find a solution to 
global climate change are unlikely to succeed.”9 Meanwhile, China suffers 
from the adverse consequences of climate change, and the impact has closely 
                                                                                                                           
 2 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATIONS, AND VULNERABILITY 1133, 1136 (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/ [https://
perma.cc/C5JD-SS7K]. This report asserts that “the effects of climate change are already occurring 
on all continents and across the oceans.” See Climate Change Effects Already Seen on All Conti-
nents, All Oceans, EARTH SKY (Mar. 31, 2014), http://earthsky.org/science-wire/climate-change-
effects-already-seen-on-all-continents-all-oceans [https://perma.cc/2L4G-VWXZ]. It was produced 
by “[a] total of 309 coordinating lead authors . . . and review editors, drawn from 70 countries . . . .” 
Id.  It also “enlisted the help of 436 contributing authors, and a total of 1,729 expert and govern-
ment reviewers.” Id. In addition, “an extensive dataset of 1,372 climate researchers and their pub-
lication and citation data . . . show[s] that . . . 97–98% of the climate researchers most actively 
publishing in the field . . . support the tenets of [anthropogenic climate change] outlined by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change . . . .” See William R.L. Anderegg et al., Expert 
Credibility in Climate Change 107 PNAS 12,107, 12,107 (2010). 
 3 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MANAGING THE RISKS OF EXTREME 
EVENTS AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 7, 3–21 (Christopher B. 
Field et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter IPCC RISK REPORT], https://www.ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/images/
uploads/SREX-All_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3P3-YANF]. 
 4 U. N. ENV’T PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIVE CLIMATE CHANGE WORKING GRP., ADAPTATION 
AND VULNERABILITY TO CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF THE FINANCE SECTOR 14 (2006), http://
www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/CEO_briefing_adaptation_vulnerability_2006.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9NP4-QUQX] (“[I]t seems very likely that the [sic] there will be a ‘peak’ year that will 
record costs over 1 trillion USD before 2040.”). 
 5 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 6 Joseph MacDougald & Peter Kochenburger, Insurance and Climate Change, 47 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 719, 720 (2013). 
 7 JOS G.J. OLIVIER ET AL., PBL NETH. ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY, TRENDS IN GLOBAL CO2 
EMISSIONS: 2012 REPORT 1, 6 (2012), http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/CO2REPORT2012.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DG5C-T94H]. 
 8 Alex Wang, Climate Change Policy and Law in China, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTER-
NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW (Cinnamon P. Carlarne et al. eds., 2016) (forthcoming). 
 9 Id. 
2016] Mitigation of Climate Change Risks and Regulation by Insurance 321 
followed the global trend.10 Floods, heavy rainfall, landslides, and many 
other climate hazards are likely to increase dramatically in China.11 The 
increasing frequency and intensity of catastrophe disasters will no doubt 
impede the already vulnerable socioeconomic development of China.12 
It has been recognized that two factors may increase climate change 
risks: (a) the rising GHG emissions, which will increase the frequency and 
intensity of climate hazards,13 and (b) the accumulation of value-at-risk, 
such as the concentration of the world’s population and property, in 
vulnerable areas.14 Therefore, mitigation of climate change risk involves not 
only human intervention to reduce GHG emissions but also prevention of 
potential losses caused by climate hazards. Among the many proposed 
solutions to risk mitigation, insurance has received increased attention due to 
its emphasis on risk management and its regulatory function in influencing 
policyholders’ behavior. In other words, insurance could not only compen-
sate the victims of climate hazards but also reduce climate change risks. 
This Article examines the ability of two types of insurance—liability 
insurance and catastrophe insurance—to regulate and thus help mitigate 
climate change risks, including risks from rising GHG emissions, and considers 
the lessons for China. Part I examines the connection between climate change 
and insurance. 15  Part II focuses specifically on the insurability of cli-
                                                                                                                           
 10 QIN DAHE ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT CHANGES IN CHINA (I): 
CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT CHANGES IN CHINA AND THEIR PROJECTIONS 1, 4–9 (2005). 
 11 “[B]ased on the regression analysis of natural disaster occurrence and average global tem-
perature from 1980 to 2010, the frequency of epidemics, extreme temperature, flood and storm was 
estimated to increase by 506 times per year if the average global temperature increases by 1°C.” Sha 
Chen et al., Natural Disasters in China: 1900–2011, 69 NAT. HAZARDS 1597, 1598 (2013). 
 12 See id. at 1597–98. 
 13 “[S]cientific consensus has established with significant confidence a link between CO2 
emissions and human-induced global warming.” Daniel J. Grimm, Note, Global Warming and 
Market Share Liability: A Proposed Model for Allocating Tort Damages Among CO2 Producers, 32 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 209, 211–12 (2007). Similar statements have been confirmed by the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency. See 549 
U.S. 497, 504–05 (2007). “[A] doubling of CO2 may increase the frequency of the most intense 
cyclones, although attribution of the 30-year trends to global warming would require a longer global 
data record . . . .” P.J. Webster et al., Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and Intensity 
in a Warming Environment, 309 SCI. 1844, 1846 (2005) (internal citation omitted); see also Thomas 
R. Knutson & Robert E. Tuleya, Impact of CO2-Induced Warming on Simulated Hurricane Intensity 
and Precipitation: Sensitivity to the Choice of Climate Model and Convective Parameterization, 17 
J. CLIMATE 3477, 3481 (2004). 
 14 Value-at-risk refers to the increase in the value, such as asset values, exposed to natural haz-
ards. See Arthur Charpentier, Insurability of Climate Risks, 33 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 91, 
91–109 (2008), https://www.genevaassociation.org/media/246144/ga2008_gp33(1)_charpentier.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6GXL-99E4]; Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Climate 
Change, Insurability of Large-Scale Disasters, and the Emerging Liability Challenge, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1795, 1805, 1807 (2007). 
 15 See infra notes 19–45 and accompanying text. 
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mate-related liability risk and catastrophe risk, respectively.16 Part III explores 
why regulation by liability insurance, whose appropriateness relies on the 
efficiency of tort-based climate change litigation for loss mitigation, is 
infeasible, especially in China.17 Finally, Part IV compares the liability insur-
ance model with the catastrophe insurance model and then proposes a catas-
trophe-insurance-based private-public partnership for China.18 
I. CLIMATE CHANGE AND INSURANCE 
A. The Impact of Climate Change on the Insurance Industry 
Inevitably, climate change does and will continue to affect the insurance 
industry, whose function is to shield individuals and businesses from risk.19 
The American International Group (“AIG”), Swiss Re, Lloyd’s of London, 
and other leading insurers and reinsurers all identify climate change as a 
major threat to global risk management.20 Major types of insurance products 
have been affected by climate change. The most widely recognized impact is 
catastrophic property losses caused by extreme weather hazards.21 The level 
of economic losses, including damages to buildings, houses, factories, and 
business interruption, has increased dramatically due to both climate change 
and an increasing concentration of the world’s population in vulnerable ar-
eas.22 For example, in 1992, Hurricane Andrew caused havoc for catastrophe 
insurers.23 The total paid claims were $15.5 billion; more than ten insurers 
went into insolvency.24 Some property insurers who suffered from extensive 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See infra notes 46–73 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 74–118 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 119–151 and accompanying text. 
 19 James M. Davis, Global Warming Litigation—Implications for Insurance Coverage, in NEW 
APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE: CURRENT CRITICAL ISSUES IN INSURANCE LAW 1, 1 (2007). 
 20 AIG’S POLICY AND PROGRAMS ON ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (n.d.), http://
media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/76/76115/aig_climate_change_updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CN65-WVUW]; see Trevor Maynard, Climate Change: Impacts on Insurers and How They Can Help 
with Adaptation and Mitigation, 33 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 140, 140 (2008), https://
www.genevaassociation.org/media/246394/ga2008_gp33(1)_maynard.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6FU-
ZAAC]. 
 21 Christina Ross et al., Limiting Liability in the Greenhouse: Insurance Risk-Management 
Strategies in the Context of Global Climate Change, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 251, 252 (2007). 
 22 See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 14, at 1806. 
 23  RAWLE O. KING, CONG. RES. SERV., HURRICANES AND DISASTER RISK FINANCING 
THROUGH INSURANCE: CHALLENGES AND POLICY OPTIONS, at CRS-4 to -5 (2005), http://www.au.
af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl33086.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZZM-TDGL]. 
 24  LYNNE MCCHRISTIAN, INS. INFO. INST., HURRICANE ANDREW AND INSURANCE: THE 
ENDURING IMPACT OF AN HISTORIC STORM 2, 5 (2012), http://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/
paper_HurricaneAndrew_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3M3G-RPMW]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTA-
BILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-941, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISK: THE ROLE OF RISK-LINKED SE-
CURITIES AND FACTORS AFFECTING THEIR USE 11 (2002). 
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catastrophe loss claims even filed lawsuits against the state for its negligence 
in preparing for and mitigating the damage from climate-change-related 
weather events.25 
Similarly, impacts of climate change on the liability insurance sector are 
beginning to appear.26 Liability claims related to climate change are already 
being filed.27 Hundreds of climate change cases have been brought in the 
courts of eighteen countries on six continents; this litigation is projected to 
impose material costs on liability insurers.28 Additionally, climate change 
presents public health concerns relevant to life-health insurance lines. For 
example, extreme weather may cause possible outbreaks of respiratory and 
infectious diseases that increase the severity of personal risks including ill-
ness, disability, and death.29 
Among different lines of insurance products, non–life insurers have to 
make much more effort than life insurers to address the impacts of climate 
change.30 Litigation over property losses and liability, especially the dam-
ages to structures caused by extreme weather hazards, receives the most 
attention. 31  Meanwhile, much less consideration has been given to life 
                                                                                                                           
 25See Climate Change: Insurance Issues, INS. INFO. INST. (Sept. 2014), http://www.iii.org/
issue-update/climate-change-insurance-issues [https://perma.cc/EF3D-WH7C]. For example, “[i]n 
May 2014, subsidiaries of Farmers Insurance filed class-action lawsuits against a number of 
communities in the Chicago area, arguing that they had not done enough to prepare for last year’s 
heavy rains and widespread flooding, which could have been anticipated due to global warming.” 
Id. They argued that extensive property damages were caused by these extreme weather hazards. 
See id. 
 26 The relevant categories of liability insurance surrounding climate change impact include 
commercial general liability, product liability, environmental liability, professional liability (di-
rectors’ and officers’ liability insurance), political risk liability concerning new government poli-
cies, and personal and commercial vehicle liability. See Ross et al., supra note 21, at 282–83. 
 27 See id. at 258. 
 28 See JACQUELINE PEEL & HARI M. OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 1–2 (James 
Crawford & John S. Bell eds., 2015). 
 29 Sean B. Hecht, Climate Change and the Transformation of Risk: Insurance Matters, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1575–76 (2008). 
 30 Non-life insurers develop modeling techniques that enable them to predict the increasingly 
visible signs of climate change risk. For example, by using state-of-the-art modeling techniques, 
several important findings are released on the financial impact on insured risk of “precipita-
tion-induced inland floods in Great Britain, winter windstorms in the United Kingdom, and ty-
phoons in China.” Peter Daley et al., The Financial Risks of Climate Change 3 (Ass’n of British 
Insurers, ABI Research Paper No. 19, 2009). Life insurers may not be well prepared for the dramatic 
changes in mortality and morbidity relating to illness and death caused by extreme weather. See 
Hsin-Chun Wang, Adaptation to Climate Change and Insurance Mechanism: A Feasible Proposal 
Based on a Catastrophe Insurance Model for Taiwan, 9 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 317, 322 (2014). 
 31 For example, “U.S.-based insurers’ knowledge of climate change impacts has been largely 
focused on property and casualty (P&C) insurance lines,” especially on “damage to fixed struc-
tures.” See Ross et al., supra note 21, at 257–58. In addition, most climate change litigations involve 
non-life insurers rather than life insurers. See PEEL & OSOFSKY, supra note 28, at 1–4. 
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exposures.32 Therefore, this Article will mainly discuss mitigation of climate 
change risks through liability insurance and catastrophe insurance. 
B. Why Insurance Could Theoretically Mitigate Climate Change Risks 
As a well-known professional risk management mechanism, insurance 
plays an important role in mitigating both property and liability risks.33 For 
example, a 2012 report of the IPCC identified insurance as a risk mitigation 
tool for extreme weather events.34 Because they assume both liability and 
property risks, in theory insurers have the incentives and the capacity to miti-
gate risks and the resulting losses.35 Scholars of regulation-by-insurance, also 
called insurance-as-governance, propose several theoretical explanations for 
insurance’s risk mitigation function.36 
Some scholars assert that, in the modern state, insurers often perform 
behavior-control functions and create incentives for policyholders to mitigate 
risks.37 For example, through insurance rate classification, liability insurers 
can charge experience-rated premiums and thus induce policyholders to “be-
have more carefully than they would otherwise.”38 In practice, insurance laws’ 
reluctance to prohibit rate classification based on controllable characteristics 
supports insurers’ behavior-control functions. Some scholars claim that, 
compared to the state, insurers have the capacity to manage moral hazard 
because of both superior information and competition. 39  Besides ex post 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Ross et al., supra note 21, at 279–81. Life exposures generally refer to personal risks like 
illness, disability, and death. See Wang, supra note 30, at 322. 
 33 Howard C. Kunreuther, Linking Insurance and Mitigation to Manage Natural Disaster Risk, 
in HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 593, 594 (Georges Dionne ed., 2000). 
 34 IPCC RISK REPORT, supra note 3, at 35, 55. 
 35 “If an insurer can lower its premiums by lowering its risk of paying claims, it can undercut 
its competitors by charging lower premiums, thereby attracting more business. Marketplace con-
siderations, rather than altruism, drive insurers to reduce risk.” See John A. Cogan Jr., The Uneasy 
Case for Food Safety Liability Insurance, 81 BROOKLYN L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). With respect 
to capacity, insurers have many techniques to reduce risk, and the consensus is that these techniques 
work reasonably well. See Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, The Law and Economics of Liability 
Insurance: A Theoretical and Empirical Review, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN THE ECONOMICS OF 
TORT 169, 169 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013). 
 36 See infra notes 37, 39–40 and accompanying text. 
 37 Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 685 (2013); 
Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing Risk, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE 
OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 1, 12–13 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002); Jeffrey 
W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1489, 1498–1501 (2010). 
 38 Abraham, supra note 37, at 685; see, e.g., Can You Afford Not to Be in Good Hands?, ALL-
STATE, https://www.allstate.com/auto-insurance/auto-insurance-comparison.aspx [https://perma.cc/
2AFM-W8VC]. 
 39 Moral hazard is the tendency to exercise less care to avoid losses. See Tom Baker, On the 
Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 239 (1996). By “utilizing the methodologies of 
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indemnification, insurance uses regulatory techniques such as risk-based 
premiums, deductibles, exclusions, and loss-reduction services, to give 
policyholders the incentive to reduce risks and invest in prevention measures.40 
Theoretically, risk-based pricing is regarded as the central approach of 
insurers to risk mitigation. Insurers’ premium-setting process gives policy-
holders the financial incentive to undertake mitigation measures. In theory, 
the insurance premium is based on the expected overall losses, derived by 
multiplying loss probability by loss severity. 41  Reducing either the 
probability or the severity of loss may lower the premium. As long as such 
reduction cost is lower than the discount of the premium, policyholders 
would likely undertake mitigation.42 If the loss probability and loss severity 
are too high, however, insurers may refuse to underwrite in the first place.43 
What has been explained previously about insurance in general also 
applies to liability and catastrophe insurance. In the case of liability 
insurance, which is designed to defend and indemnify insured emitters of 
GHGs in climate-change-related tort lawsuits, insurers could charge a lower 
premium for the insured emitter who reduces GHG emissions, or refuse to 
underwrite that risk if the insured is emitting too much. In the case of 
catastrophe insurance, which is designed to compensate victims of extreme 
weather hazards, insurers could, through higher premiums, deter the insured 
from residing in higher risk areas as compared to lower risk areas. 44 
Therefore, theoretically, insurance could help reduce the GHG emissions, 
reduce value-at-risk, and thus realize the mitigation of climate change risks. 
                                                                                                                           
actuarialism, private contracting, and ex post claim investigation,” insurers can easily collect cus-
tomer’s purchasing information, thereby replacing government. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. 
Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 
201 (2012). “It is generally believed that insurance markets tend to be highly competitive with 
respect to price.” See id. at 201 n.11 (citing Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Consumer Demand in 
Insurance Markets, 3 ERASMUS L. REV. 23, 43 (2010)). 
 40 Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers 
Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1416–23 (2013); Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 
39, at 203–17; Steven Shavell, On the Social Function and Regulation of Liability Insurance, 25 
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 166, 168–70 (2000), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/
shavell/pdf/25_Geneva_Papers_Risk_Insur_166.pdf [https://perma.cc/8H93-XDLT]; Haitao Yin et 
al., Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: Does the Private Insurance Market Reduce 
Environmental Accidents?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 325, 328–29 (2011). 
 41 Peter Molk, Private Versus Public Insurance for Natural Hazards: Individual Behavior’s 
Role in Loss Mitigation, in RISK ANALYSIS OF NATURAL HAZARDS 265, 265–77 (Paolo Gardoni et 
al. eds., 2015). 
 42 Id. 
 43 This also serves as a gatekeeping function. See Tom Baker & Thomas O. Farrish, Liability 
Insurance & the Regulation of Firearms, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE 
CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 292, 294–95 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2008). 
 44 Swenja Surminski, The Role of Insurance in Reducing Direct Risk: The Case of Flood 
Insurance, 7 INT’L REV. ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 241, 264 (2013). 
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While promising in theory, this is not always true in practice. Whether 
insurance could send these valuable price signals for climate change risk 
mitigation depends on a number of practical issues. The following discussion 
will examine how liability insurance and catastrophe insurance function as 
risk mitigation in practice.45 
II. INSURABILITY OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS 
Before answering the question of how insurance can function as risk 
mitigation, as a threshold matter, we need to revisit the issue of whether 
climate change risks are insurable, which concerns the willingness and 
affordability of insurance companies to insure climate-related liability and 
catastrophe risk.46 
A. Insurability of Climate Change Liability Risk 
People worry that climate change claims might be the “next asbestos” 
for insurers. Asbestos claims were some of the first mass tort cases to push 
the boundaries of liability insurance insurability and coverage. 47  Many 
describe climate change liability risk as an “emerging risk.” When insurers 
initially underwrote climate change risks, they were perhaps not aware of all 
the potential impacts. But now those risks are perceived as potentially 
significant, and even possibly the greatest risk to the property/casualty 
insurance industry.48 In defining whether climate change liability risks are 
insurable, the insurance literature identifies certain basic requirements to be 
considered: 
(1) Actuarial estimation requires that the insurers can identify, quantify, and 
estimate the frequency and severity of risks and the resulting 
losses. 
(2) A causal relationship requires that the causes of losses must be directly 
assignable and allocable to the insured as the subject of liability. 
(3) Randomness requires that the materialization of the risk must be random, 
unintended, and unexpected.49 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See infra notes 46–73 and accompanying text. 
 46 Wang, supra note 30, at 323. 
 47 TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 
330 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 2013). 
 48 Climate Change No. 1 in Top 10 Risks Facing the Insurance Industry, INS. J. (Mar. 12, 
2008), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2008/03/12/88138.htm [https://perma.cc/
47HM-5DVT]. 
 49 SWISS RE, EMERGING RISKS: A CHALLENGE FOR LIABILITY UNDERWRITERS 33 (2009); 
Baruch Berliner, Large Risks and Limits of Insurability, 10 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 313–
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While these requirements present challenges for liability insurers, arguments 
that climate change liability risk is uninsurable may not always be convincing. 
First, liability insurers may worry that climate change presents uncer-
tainty as to the intensity and the frequency of natural disasters50 and that 
increasing litigations could cause substantial financial losses to insurers be-
cause insurers’ duty to defend51 is much broader than their duty to indemnify, 
at least in the United States; however, “neither the size of the risk” nor po-
tential loss estimates have prevented successful insurance operations in the 
past.52 Looking “back at insurance history, there are plenty of examples of 
insurance against [catastrophe] losses that the insurers could not predict in 
advance . . . .” 53  Examples include commercial satellite insurance and 
commercial aircraft insurance. These insurance products both involve huge 
losses, and at the initial stage of underwriting, insurers had no historical data 
to assess the intensity and the frequency of losses.54 Even considering that 
these risks are still smaller than those from climate change, insurance history 
is full of what people in the insurance trade call assessment insurance.55 
Assessment insurance allows insurers to avoid the same budget constraints 
they used to encounter, and thereby lessens the fear of uncertainty.56 
In addition to some degree of certainty regarding the size of the risk and 
potential loss, for a claim to be insurable there must be an actual causal re-
                                                                                                                           
29 (1985) (analyzing the limits to insurability of a given risk); see also Charpentier, supra note 14, 
at 91–109; Wang, supra note 30, at 324. 
 50 “[T]he uncertainty of climate change risk will significantly affect the insurability of liability 
relating to tort litigation . . . .” Wang, supra note 30, at 325. It is inevitable for liability insurers to 
pay enormous litigation costs for the insured. See id. at 324–25. 
 51 In liability insurance policy, “the duty to defend” is an essential part which means that the 
insurers agreed not only to pay tort judgments against the policyholder but also to defend the law-
suits brought by plaintiffs against the policyholder even if the suit was groundless, false, or fraud-
ulent. In this sense, liability insurance in effect became “litigation insurance.” See Jeffrey W. 
Stempel, Insurance and Climate Change Litigation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 230, 235 (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky 
eds., 2009). 
 52 Dwight Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, and Uninsura-
ble Risks, 64 J. RISK & INS. 205, 207 (1997). 
 53 Tom Baker, Embracing Risk, Sharing Responsibility, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 561, 569 (2008). 
 54 See KARL H. BORCH, ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE 315 (C.J. Bliss & M.D. Intriligator eds., 
1990); Jaffee & Russell, supra note 52, at 205, 207.  
 55 See Baker, supra note 53, at 569 (“With assessment insurance, the insurer has the ability to 
come back and collect more after a loss to help people who need it if the insurance fund runs dry.”). 
 56 For example, consider Florida’s Citizens Property Insurance Corporation. “Citizens can se-
cure emergency funding for catastrophic losses that exceed its own reserves” under the assessment 
process. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insur-
ance 15 (U. Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 111, 2015), http://repository.
law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1221&context=law_econ_current [https://perma.cc/H7CE-
6VRU]. Citizens could impose a tax on all Citizens’ policyholders. “Part of this assessment/tax is 
collected up front, and part is spread out over a number of years, until the deficit is paid.” See id. 
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lationship between the greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) emitted by the insured 
and the resulting property damages or bodily injuries. If not, the liability 
insurer has a strong argument for denying coverage. Causal uncertainty 
between climate change and the GHG emitters will affect the efficiency of 
tort-based climate change litigation.57 It is still a matter of debate whether 
large GHG emitters—such as fossil fuel companies, power plants, and au-
tomobile manufacturers—can be liable for the losses of extreme weather 
events and sea level rise as the potential tortfeasors. 58 Considering this 
causal uncertainty, climate change liability risk cannot be considered en-
tirely uninsurable because the probability of an insured loss is lower. 
Another obstacle to insurability is that the timing, magnitude, or loca-
tion of extreme weather events cannot be known precisely in advance, and 
thus there might be both a demand for such insurance and willingness by 
insurers to underwrite such risks. The randomness of the climate hazards also 
means that insureds have no control over the hazard creating such liability 
risk, which speaks to the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection.59 
Moral hazard and adverse selection are generally caused by asymmetric 
information, which exist in the situation where one party has more or better 
information than the other in the transaction.60 In cases of climate hazards, 
however, insureds have no more information than insurers. 
Retroactive liability—which refers to the fact that in the interval be-
tween the original tort and the claim for damages the standard of care applied 
by the courts may change—may also endanger the insurability of long-tail 
risks.61 Indeed, a state court might require insurers (ex post) to extend cov-
erage or pay out based on retroactive liability, which some jurisdications 
have adopted for environment liabilities.62 Some courts have equated the 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See infra notes 76–85 and accompanying discussion. 
 58 David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-based Climate Change 
Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 22–33 (2003). 
 59 Jaffee & Russell, supra note 52, at 206. Adverse selection means that those with the highest 
risk are most likely to buy the insurance. See VÉRONIQUE BRUGGEMAN, COMPENSATING CA-
TASTROPHE VICTIMS: A COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH 64–66 (Kurt 
Deketelaere ed., 2010). 
 60 BRUGGEMAN, supra note 59, at 64–66. 
 61 Michael Faure & Paul Fenn, Retroactive Liability and the Insurability of Long-Tail Risks, 19 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 487, 490–93 (1999). Simply put, long-tail risk refers to the risks arising out 
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waste) was already considered wrongful at the moment when the act happened (e.g., twenty-five 
years ago) even though it may be doubtful that this actually was the case.” See Michael G. Faure, 
Insurability of Damage Caused by Climate Change: A Commentary, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1875, 
1877–78 (2007). 
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emission of GHGs to the dumping of toxic waste.63 Liability insurers could 
argue in response, however, that emitting GHGs is not like dumping toxic 
waste, which was affirmed in a finding of liability by judges in some 
cases;64 it was not wrongful at the time of the act of emission and may not 
justify an action in tort, and thus emitting GHGs may not apply such retro-
active case law.65 
B. Insurability of Climate Change Catastrophe Risk 
Different from liability insurance, catastrophe insurance is a type of 
first-party insurance that is designed to indemnify the insured for direct 
losses resulting from a covered peril, the prospective victims being paid by 
the insurers once a covered event occurs.66 Climate change risks, such as 
extreme weather or sea level rise, present significant challenges to catastrophe 
insurance due to huge losses.67Catastrophes are often called “uninsurable 
risks,” and insurers are likely to flee from underwriting them.68 The insur-
ance literature often identifies three factors defining an uninsurable catas-
trophe risk: 
(1) Ambiguity of risk, also called uncertainty: the inability to identify and 
quantify probabilities of predicted losses with sufficient precision; 
(2) Losses and insolvency: concern that the largest possible loss could 
threaten insurers’ solvency; and 
(3) Appetite: insurers lack the desire to underwrite climate change risks at a 
price policyholders are willing to pay.69 
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 64 See Gerrit Betlem & Michael Faure, Environmental Toxic Torts in Europe: Some Trends in 
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 66 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 153 (2d ed. 1984); ROBERT 
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This Article argues that despite these concerns, climate change catastrophe 
risks are, to some extent, insurable. 
Climate change leads to an increase in the uncertainty associated with 
the frequency and severity of extreme weather events. When there is “too 
much” uncertainty, the exposure becomes unmeasurable and unquantifiable, 
and thus uninsurable. Nonetheless, with the steadily growing body of data on 
catastrophe events and the development of catastrophe models that could 
help estimate potential damages, natural catastrophe risk is evolving away 
from a highly uncertain line of business.70 
Further, similar to liability insurance discussed above, catastrophe in-
surance involves concerns and arguments about the potential magnitude of 
catastrophe losses. To address the concern of insolvency, outside capital 
could supplement catastrophe insurers’ capacity to cover claims. Reinsurance 
and insurance-linked securitization, such as catastrophe bonds,71 could pro-
vide additional capital sources to primary insurers. In addition, and as a last 
resort, the government could also contribute to solving this problem, because 
the government has a deep credit capacity due to its ability to raise money 
through tax or issuing government bond far more easily than private insur-
ers or reinsurers.72 
Third, the asymmetric information problem that affects insurers’ appe-
tite may not be as severe as presumed. The so-called moral hazard might be 
minimal because the risk of catastrophic loss is not the private information of 
the insured.73 In addition, many insurers cooperate with scientists on pre-
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http://attach3.bdwm.net/attach/boards/Insurance/M.1132324052.A/sigma_4_2005_e_rev.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X34A-BSWM]. 
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Lessons to Learn, CHINA DAILY READERS BLOG (Aug. 14, 2013), http://blog.chinadaily.com.cn/
blog-1158878-11960.html [https://perma.cc/8RDX-NUZZ]. “Catastrophe bonds also called ‘cat 
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 72 Louis Kaplow, Incentives and Government Relief for Risk, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 167, 
167–75 (1991). 
 73 See Jaffee & Russell, supra note 52, at 206. 
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dicting climate change risks and thus have the advantage of information. To 
some extent, it helps insurers lessen moral hazard problem of the insureds. 
III. REGULATION BY LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR MITIGATION  
OF GHG EMISSIONS? 
Although liability insurers in theory have the ability to mitigate green-
house gas (“GHG”) emissions through regulatory tools, and though it may not 
be appropriate to declare climate change liability risk “uninsurable,” it is 
unlikely that regulation by liability insurance will function effectively in 
practice. Through a comparative study of the United Sates and China, this Part 
explores the possible reasons why, and identifies specific obstacles hindering 
regulation by liability insurance in China.74 
A. Tortious Liability and Liability Insurance Coverage 
The rules of tort law and the resulting liability—if any—for climate 
change risk play a major role in determining whether liability insurance 
could help mitigate GHG emissions. Any such liability would force GHG 
emitters to internalize the risk that insurers then regulate and manage.75 If 
polluters face no liability for their behavior, there will be no demand for 
liability insurance in the first place. Thus, the current obstacles for the 
establishment of tortious liability need to be clearly understood. 
1. Obstacles to Tortious Liability 
Causation uncertainty is an important issue in climate change tortious 
cases, as claimants must show that their damages are caused by defendants’ 
actions.76 In climate change cases, as in many toxic tort cases, a legally 
sufficient causal relationship does not exist. Although the United States Su-
preme Court has recognized a general causal link between climate change 
and man-made GHG emissions,77 proof of proximate causation by individ-
ual emitters is generally not available.78 No decided U.S. case has found 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See infra notes 75–117 and accompanying text. 
 75 Internalizing the risk is contrary to insurance externality which refers to the situation that 
“if insurers do not classify insureds into sufficiently narrow risk pools, insureds will in large 
measure externalize accident costs to their insurers.” See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The 
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 76 David A. Grossman, Tort-Based Climate Litigation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: 
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 77 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007). 
 78 Wang, supra note 30, at 328. 
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proximate cause between the emissions of an individual emitter and adverse 
effects (now and in the future) on the climate.79 
Causal uncertainty leads to other legal disputes that include the identi-
fication of tortfeasors and the determination of losses. Since everyone may 
emit some GHGs and contribute in some degree to climate change, climate 
change victims should determine who is a viable defendant; however, as-
sessing the damages due to climate change and determining the number of 
losses is extremely hard.80 For example, GHG emissions that cause damages 
may have happened many years ago, and this factor may hinder loss as-
sessment.81 
In response to the causal uncertainty issue, some commentators propose 
using proportional liability theory and market share liability theory to de-
termine whether the emitters should be liable for damages caused by climate 
change; however, neither provides an adequate solution to this problem.82 
With respect to proportional liability, identifying the culpable emitters and 
the appropriate amount of damages in response to the increased risk of cli-
mate-related disasters is still unfeasible in practice.83 And, in the case of 
market share liability, determining the accuracy and the scale of the emis-
sions market on a global basis is quite challenging for victims. 
Proof of causation is also required by several statutes in China. Article 2 
of the Insurance Act requires a causal link between the risk and the loss.84 A 
similar provision is found in Article 216(1) of the Maritime Code.85 Taken 
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tgether, causation uncertainty and other obstacles suggest that, under current 
tort rules, tortious liability might not be established between GHG emissions 
of individual emitters and climate change victims’ losses. 
2. Obstacles for Liability Insurance Coverage 
Even if a GHG emitter’s tortious liability was established by a court, 
obstacles would remain to insurance coverage. AES Corp. v. Steadfast In-
surance Co.—the first and only case directly addressing climate change 
claims under a liability policy—shows the difficulty of prevailing on a lia-
bility insurance claim for climate change liability.86 
A vital question for liability insurance coverage is whether the damage 
was caused by an occurrence. An “occurrence” is typically defined in U.S. 
liability policies as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure 
to substantially the same general harmful conditions.”87 Do GHG emissions 
constitute an “occurrence”? The answer in AES is no.88 The court applied the 
“eight corners rule” and reasoned that “when the insured knows or should 
have known the consequences of his actions, there is no occurrence.”89 In 
other words, if the insured was aware of the GHG emissions, and the re-
sulting damage was foreseeable, then there was objective intent based on the 
perspective of a hypothetical “reasonable” person.90 The Virginia Supreme 
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532, 534. 
 87 Virginia Supreme Court to Decide Insurance Coverage for Climate Change Suits, MAR-
TEN LAW (June 2, 2011), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20110602-insurance-coverage-
climate-change [https://perma.cc/7ZKB-VA78]. 
 88 725 S.E.2d at 534–35. 
 89 The so called “eight corners rule” means the court determines whether the allegations in the 
underlying complaint come within the coverage provided by the policy by comparing the “four 
corners” of the underlying complaint with the “four corners” of the policy. See id. 
 90 Id. at 536. 
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court declined to adopt the insured’s subjective intent standard in assessing 
“occurrence.”91 
Chinese law presents similar rules referred to as “indirect intention.” 
Article 27 of the Insurance Act provides: “Where the assured or the insured 
intentionally causes the occurrence of an insured event, the insurer is 
entitled to terminate the contract and shall not be liable for indemnity 
payment of insurance benefits.”92 When the insured does not intend the 
harm but “knows with substantial certainty that it would occur as a result of 
his action,” that action meets the tort law requirement of “indirect 
intention.”93 Indirect intention may entitle the insurer to reject the claim 
since the insured’s act does “intentionally” cause damage.94 
There are further issues beyond those raised by AES. For example, the 
pollution exclusion is not addressed in AES. Whether carbon dioxide is a 
“pollutant” within Commercial General Liability (“CGL”) policy’s pollution 
exclusion is hotly contested,95 although insureds argue that carbon dioxide is 
an “omnipresent,” “odorless and colorless gas,” and thus should not be 
categorized as a pollutant.96 This argument was challenged in Massachusetts 
v. EPA.97 The United States Supreme Court held that GHGs fell within the 
definition of “air pollutants” in Section 302(g) of the Clean Air Act.98 The 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency adheres to this judgment that GHGs 
are “without a doubt ‘physical [and] chemical . . . substance[s] which [are] 
emitted into . . . the ambient air.”99 
In China, other legal doctrines impede liability insurance’s potential to 
mitigate risk. An insurer’s duty to defend is a unique example. In the United 
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States, the duty to defend, an essential part of a liability insurance policy, 
means that the insurers agree not only to pay tort judgments against the 
policyholder but also to defend the lawsuits brought by plaintiffs against the 
policyholder even if the suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent.100 Due to the 
duty to defend, liability insurers in the United States might be forced to 
become involved in climate change litigations.101 In China, however, in-
surance law only specifies the liability insurers’ duty to indemnify but 
“imposes no duty to defend the insureds.”102 Although insurers have the 
right to participate in an action against the plaintiffs, in practice few insurers 
participate in the tortious litigation or the settlement.103 Since insurers aren’t 
bound by a duty to defend, when claimants sue GHG emitters, liability in-
surers have fewer incentives to become involved in such tortious liability 
cases, let alone in regulating emitters’ behaviors. In other words, they have 
few incentives to regulate emitters’ behaviors because it’s less costly for 
them if the insureds produce more emissions and then if they are sued as a 
result. 
B. Environmental Liability Insurance in China: Obstacles and Lessons 
The prospects are not rosy for mitigating GHG emissions in China 
through liability insurance. Because climate change liability risk is a kind of 
environmental risk, environmental liability insurance in China is worth 
analyzing for possible lessons and obstacles. The number of environmental 
tort liability cases is rapidly increasing in China.104 Meanwhile, environ-
mental-risk insurance products are becoming increasingly available and 
strongly promoted by the Chinese government.105 Even if climate change 
risk was covered under existing environmental policies, however, it is un-
likely that such insurance could provide significant incentives for reduction 
of GHG emissions. The reasons are as follows. 
First, the penetration rate of environmental liability insurance is low. A 
glance at the environmental insurance market in China reveals three major 
insurance products covering environmental risks.106 The first product is a 
general liability insurance policy that was extended three or four years ago to 
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cover several kinds of pollution risks.107 A second is environmental liability 
insurance that mainly covers personal injuries and property damage caused 
by pollution; Chinese insurers started offering this stand-alone policy after 
2007.108 A third option involves pollution-site liability that provides cover-
age for damage to third parties as well as remediation costs for polluted 
sites. 109 Since 2007, eight provinces and cities—Jiangsu, Hubei, Hunan, 
Henan, Chongqing, Shenzhen, Ningbo, and Shenyang—have been chosen to 
develop and promote liability insurance to cover various dangerous industrial 
risks, such as dangerous chemicals, waste treatment, and petrochemicals.110 
The revenue from environmental liability insurance only accounted for 0.015 
percent of the total liability insurance revenue in these experimental areas in 
2009.111 
Second, coverage obstacles still exist under environmental liability in-
surance policies, which cover pollution. Pollution is not clearly defined in 
the general environmental liability insurance policy. 112  Whether GHGs 
belong among pollutants remains an uncertainty. To avoid potential risk, the 
insurers may modify the policy language to exclude liability arising from 
climate change claims against policyholders. Further, the causal uncertainty 
associated with climate-change-related claims makes it difficult to bring a 
claim. Finally, the third-party victims still need to prove a causal link be-
tween their losses and the insureds’ emissions. 
As a result of the above debates related to tortious liability rules, lia-
bility insurance coverage, and the environmental policies market in China, 
liability insurance would not be viable and may not be efficient in encour-
aging the mitigation of current GHG emissions. Government regulation 
might be the more efficient approach. China’s approach to addressing GHG 
emissions “relies heavily on top-down, command-and-control regulation, 
built around bureaucratic targets and controls for local officials and 
state-owned enterprise leaders.”113 Most recently, the Chinese central gov-
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ernment has made an international commitment to “lower carbon dioxide 
emissions per unit of GDP to 60% to 65% from the 2005 level by 2030” and 
to start its national emissions trading system in 2017.114 
In the future, the government could also establish a climate change 
compensation fund and require major emitters to bear the responsibility for 
premiums.115 The no-fault compensation mechanism of the climate change 
fund could provide basic compensation for victims and might adopt the 
polluter-pays principle to encourage emitters to internalize the external cost 
of GHGs.116 This scheme might be more viable than a tort-based liability 
insurance model because it could avoid the obstacles to tortious liability and 
liability insurance coverage.117 Because regulation by liability insurance in 
mitigation of GHG emissions is not viable in China, the following Part dis-
cusses regulation by catastrophe insurance and explores how to mitigate the 
value-at-risk.118 
IV. REGULATION BY CATASTROPHE INSURANCE FOR  
MITIGATION OF VALUE-AT-RISK 
While third-party liability insurance might be infeasible for mitigating 
climate change risks, catastrophe insurance has drawn attention as a means 
of mitigating climate change risks—mainly value-at-risk—both in theoreti-
cal discussion and in practice.119 In China, catastrophe insurance does have 
the potential to regulate insureds’ behavior so as to mitigate risks. 
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A. The Liability Insurance Versus Catastrophe Insurance Models 
Insurance is regarded as a powerful regulatory mechanism in many 
fields of liability, including automobile accidents, workplace injuries, 
environmental harms, corporate and securities liability, medical malpractice, 
defective products, and defamation.120 In the traditional framework, liability 
insurance can incentivize potential tortfeasors to internalize the costs of the 
harms they create through its capacity to manage moral hazard and other bad 
acts of the insureds.121 Thus, it improves the efficiency of risk mitigation. 
When it comes to climate change risks, as discussed above, however, regu-
lation by liability insurance to mitigate risks faces theoretical and practical 
obstacles.122 
In contrast with liability insurance that focuses on greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”) emitters, catastrophe insurance, mainly focusing on victims of 
climate hazards, can conquer causal uncertainty and other tort liability ob-
stacles. With respect to causal uncertainty, the major barrier from tort doc-
trines would disappear because climate change victims could seek compen-
sation from catastrophe insurers directly without having to establish the lia-
bility of the emitters.123 Catastrophe insurance shifts the causal connection 
between the emitters’ activities and the losses of the victims. 
The catastrophe insurer has several regulatory techniques to minimize 
value-at-risk and protect insureds from climate hazards, among them 
risk-based pricing, contract design, loss prevention services, and claim 
management.124 Risk-based pricing is the most basic technique for creating 
incentives to reduce risk.125 Risk-based premiums enable insurers to provide 
a discount to insureds adopting cost-effective mitigation measures and thus 
also provide a clear signal to other insureds in the market.126 By including 
such elements as deductibles, copayments, coverage amount limit, and ex-
clusions, contract design can also be used to regulate risk both directly and 
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indirectly. The deductible is an example. It can mitigate moral hazard directly 
because it prevents victims of climate hazards from shielding themselves 
entirely from loss and thus encourages them to exercise greater vigilance 
than would be the case without deductibles.127 
Furthermore, catastrophe insurers could provide loss-prevention 
services such as flood-proofing of buildings or retrofitting of houses against 
windstorms.128 With respect to climate change risks, to some extent, insurers 
have an advantage because catastrophe insurers have worked in tandem with 
scientists to identify technical and economic parameters of climate change 
risks and to develop system-wide technologies for loss prevention.129 Claim 
management is necessary to control ex post moral hazard of insureds as a 
result of their inability to change the possibility of a climate hazard despite 
their ability to mitigate disaster losses.130 Catastrophe insurers also employ 
adjusters “to investigate claimed losses, measure them, and negotiate 
payouts” to provide greater uniformity and predictability.131 
In terms of the catastrophe insurance model, drawbacks may also exist 
along with the above merits. First, because of the highly correlated nature 
and potential concentration of losses from extreme weather exposures, in-
surers’ capacity and appetite to cover such losses may not be sufficient.132 
For this reason, at least in U.S. Gulf Coast states, standard homeowners’ 
insurance policies typically exclude losses from floods and also for wind.133 
Even endorsements that add coverage for these events at additional expense 
are normally unavailable.134 The second drawback is that potential victims 
may fail to purchase insurance against low-probability extreme weather 
disasters because of the observed behavioral anomaly of individuals to un-
derestimate the expected costs of extreme weather hazards and also because 
of repeated government bailouts.135 Accordingly, these drawbacks associ-
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ated with catastrophe insurance would need to be addressed to develop a 
feasible catastrophe insurance model. 
B. Developing a Feasible Catastrophe Insurance-Based Private-Public 
Partnership for China 
Catastrophe risks have never been covered systematically by either 
private insurance or government insurance in China. For example, only 0.3 
percent of total losses were covered by insurance companies in the 2008 
Great Wenchuan Earthquake.136 It was only in 2014 that the central gov-
ernment established the catastrophe insurance program trials in the cities of 
Shenzhen and Ningbo and the region of Chuxiong where the catastrophe risk 
would be “shared between the government, insurance and reinsurance firms 
and individuals.”137 In considering the current insurance market in China, a 
phased catastrophe insurance-based private-public partnership that marries 
the merits of both insurance and government in mitigation of value-at-risk 
might address the problems described above. The nuts and bolts of this 
partnership are as follows. 
First, under such a partnership, the state would require all property in-
surers to provide catastrophe coverage for residential properties. In doing so, 
it would be important for the government to avoid interfering with private 
insurers’ actuarially fair pricing. Insurance premiums reflecting risks can 
provide individuals with accurate signals in cost-effective mitigation 
measures.138 This could be difficult because the Chinese government could 
face political pressure to interfere with insurers’ risk classification and 
risk-based premiums, particularly because risk classification is not always 
compatible with social solidarity objectives in China that promote equal 
treatment of all citizens.139 Nevertheless, even if there are concerns about the 
affordability of catastrophe insurance, it is better for the government to pro-
vide subsidies to lower-income residents, such as through insurance vouch-
ers, than to suppress insurers’ incentives to underwrite policies and distort 
risk signals provided by actuarially-based premiums. Therefore, the gov-
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ernment should neither create new institutions to supplant private solutions 
nor suppress premiums of insurance policies. As a Chinese proverb says, 
“You can’t expect the horse to run fast when you don’t let it graze.” The state 
cannot expect the insurers to underwrite policyholders’ risks if it does not let 
insurers make profits. Furthermore, that type of rate regulation would un-
dermine this insurance’s effectiveness as a risk mitigation device. 
Second, recognizing private insurers’ reluctance to underwrite catas-
trophe risks without any meaningful underwriting history, predictive model, 
or sufficient capacity, the state could provide a government-funded backstop 
that assumes the risks of any losses above a predetermined threshold, thereby 
capping private insurers’ maximum exposure. This type of cap could pro-
mote the initial entry of private insurers.140 
Third, after several years, maybe longer, when private insurers have 
gained underwriting experience and developed models, this type of gov-
ernment support could be removed. This, however, may be easier said than 
done. In this respect, the U.S. terrorism coverage program, Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act (“TRIA”), provides a cautionary lesson.141 Established after 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, TRIA has been twice extended 
for a total of nine years past its original 2005 horizon.142 This is a good 
example of why government support is difficult to phase out over time. One 
possible reason lies that insurers lobby to keep it in place. 
Fourth, the state can use its powers of compulsion to bring more 
residents into the pool, which maximizes risk spreading, in turn maximizing 
consumer participation in the insurance market and minimizing adverse 
selection worries. Compulsory insurance is practiced in some countries, such 
as in the case of the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (CCR) program in 
France143 and the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP).144 An insur-
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ance mandate is particularly important in China, given its recent history of a 
planned economy. 145 The Chinese people still have a strong reliance on 
government, especially in the aftermath of a catastrophe. Under the 
Whole-Nation System,146 the government is committed to bailing victims 
out after a disaster. According to an empirical study on property and casualty 
insurance in five Chinese provinces, there is a negative correlation between 
the amount of government relief and residents’ investment in prevention 
measures such as purchasing insurance.147 Without a compulsory require-
ment, residents in China will seldom purchase insurance to transfer casualty 
risks. 
Fifth, the state should give special treatment to low-income individuals 
currently residing in hazard-prone areas because of equity and affordability 
issues.148 For example, the state could provide means-tested vouchers that 
are a way to maintain risk-based premiums while covering part of the cost of 
insurance.149 As a condition for the voucher, the government could then 
require property owners to invest in mitigation based on their affordabil-
ity.150 
Sixth, besides intervention into the insurance market, the state could 
adopt administrative measures or regulations to require residents to take 
mitigation measures. Such measures or regulations should coordinate with 
risk-based insurance premiums. For example, the state could update its 
building code standards and enforce high-wind design provisions for resi-
dential housing.151 
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CONCLUSION 
In the context of climate change risk management, either private in-
surance or the state can play a crucial role in mitigating risks. As the pre-
ceding discussion of liability insurance and catastrophe insurance makes 
clear, catastrophe insurance is a much more feasible method of regulating 
climate change risks. In addition, to take advantage of the state’s compulsory 
power, this Article proposes a feasible solution marrying the merits of both 
state and private insurance. Compulsory catastrophe-insurance-based pri-
vate-public partnership will not only enhance mitigation of value-at-risk but 
also provide the victims with sufficient financial protections for climate 
hazards that are not eliminated. This hybrid mechanism has become a pro-
totype for developing catastrophe insurance in several countries. It should be 
developed as soon as possible in China to cope with the increasing risks of 
climate change. 
   
 
